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Abstract – This paper presents the solution about the
threat of a VBIED (Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive
Device) obtained with the DSmT (Dezert-Smarandache
Theory). This problem has been proposed recently to the
authors by Simon Maskell and John Lavery as a typi-
cal illustrative example to try to compare the different
approaches for dealing with uncertainty for decision-
making support. The purpose of this paper is to show
in details how a solid justified solution can be obtained
from DSmT approach and its fusion rules thanks to a
proper modeling of the belief functions involved in this
problem.
Keywords: Security, Decison-making support, Infor-
mation fusion, DSmT, Threat assessment.
1 The VBIED problem
• Concern: VBIED (Vehicle-Born Improvised Ex-
plosive Device) attack on an administrative build-
ing B
• Prior information: We consider an Individual
A under surveillance due to previous unstable be-
havior who drives customized white Toyota (WT)
vehicle.
• Observation done at time t − 10 min: From a
video sensor on road that leads to building B 10
min ago, one has observed a White Toyota 200m
from the building B traveling in normal traffic flow
toward building B. We consider the following two
sources of information based on this video obser-
vation available at time t− 10 min:
– Source 1: An Analyst 1 with 10 years expe-
rience analyses the video and concludes that
individual A is now probably near building B.
– Source 2: An Automatic Number Plate
Recognition (ANPR) system analyzing same
video outputs 30% probability that the vehi-
cle is individual A’s white Toyota.
• Observation done at time t − 5 min: From a
video sensor on road 15km from building B 5 min
ago one gets a video that indicates a white Toy-
ota with some resemblance to individual A’s white
Toyota. We consider the following thrid source of
information based on this video observation avail-
able at time t− 5 min:
– Source 3: An Analyst 2 (new in post) analy-
ses this video and concludes that it is improb-
able that individual A is near building B.
• Question 1: Should building B be evacuated?
• Question 2: Is experience (Analyst 1) more valu-
able than physics (the ANPR system) combined
with inexperience (Analyst 2)? How do we model
that?
NOTE: Deception (e.g., individual A using different
car, false number plates, etc.) and biasing (on the part
of the analysts) are often a part of reality, but they are
not part of this example.
2 Modeling the VBIED problem
Before applying DSmT fusion techniques to solve this
VBIED problem it is important to model the problem
in the framework of belief functions.
2.1 Marginal frames with their models
The marginal frames involved in this problem are:
• Frame related with individuals:
Θ1 = {A = Suspicious person, A¯ = not A}
• Frame related with the vehicle:
Θ2 = {V = White Toyota Vehicle, V¯ = not V }
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• Frame related with the position of a driver of a car
w.r.t the given building B:
Θ3 = {B = near building, B¯ = not B}
The underlying models of marginal frames are based on
the following very reasonable assumptions:
• Assumption 1: We assume naturally A ∩ A¯ =
∅ (avoiding Shrdinger’s cat paradox). If working
only with the frame of people Θ3, the marginal
bba’s must be defined on the power-set
2Θ1 = {∅1, A, A¯, A ∪ A¯}
• Assumption 2: We assume also that V ∩V¯ = ∅ so
that the marginal bba (if needed) must be defined
on the power-set
2Θ2 = {∅2, V, V¯ , V ∪ V¯ }
• Assumption 3: We assume also that B∩B¯ = ∅ so
that the marginal bba (if needed) must be defined
on the power-set
2Θ3 = {∅3, B, B¯, B ∪ B¯}
This modeling is disputable since the notion of
closeness/”near” is not clearly defined and we
could prefer to work on
DΘ3 = {∅3, B ∩ B¯, B, B¯, B ∪ B¯}
The emptyset elements have been indexed by the
index of the frame they are referring to for notation
convenience and avoiding confusion.
2.2 Joint frame and its model
Since we need to work with all aspects of available
information, we need to define a common joint frame
to express all what we have from different sources of
information. The easiest way for defining the joint
frame, denoted Θ, is to consider the classical Carte-
sian (cross) product space and to work with propo-
sitions (a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of propositions)
since one has a correspondence between sets and propo-
sitions [5, 6], i.e.
Θ = Θ1 ×Θ2 ×Θ3
which consists of the following 8 triplets elements
Θ = {θ1 = (A¯, V¯ , B¯), θ2 = (A, V¯ , B¯),
θ3 = (A¯, V, B¯), θ4 = (A, V, B¯),
θ5 = (A¯, V¯ , B), θ6 = (A, V¯ , B),
θ7 = (A¯, V, B), θ8 = (A, V,B)}
We define the union ∪ , intersection ∩ as componen-
twise operators in the following way:
(x1, x2, x3) ∪ (y1, y2, y3) , (x1 ∪ y1, x2 ∪ y2, x3 ∪ y3)
(x1, x2, x3) ∩ (y1, y2, y3) , (x1 ∩ y1, x2 ∩ y2, x3 ∩ y3)
The complement X¯ of X is defined in the usual way by
X¯ = (x1, x2, x3) , It \ {X}
where It is the total ignorance (i.e. the whole space of
solutions) which corresponds to the maximal element
defined by It = (It1, It2, It3), where Iti is the maximal
(ignorance) of Θi, i = 1, 2, 3. The minimum element
(absolute empty proposition) is ∅ = (∅1, ∅2, ∅3), where
∅i is the minimum element (empty proposition) of
Θi. We also define a relative minimum element in
SΘ1×Θ2×Θ3 as follows: ∅r = (x, y, z), where at least
one of the components x, y, or z is a minimal element
in its respective frame Θi. A general relative minimum
element ∅gr is defined as the union/join of all relative
minima (including the absolute minimum element).
Similarly to the relative and general relative minimum
we can define a relative maximum and a general
relative maximum, where the empty set in the above
definitions is replaced by the total ignorance. Whence
the super-power set (SΘ,∩,∪, ¯ , ∅, It) is equivalent to
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of propositions.
For example, if we consider Θ1 = {x1, x2} and Θ2 =
{y1, y2} satisfying both Shafer’s model, then Θ = Θ1×
Θ2 = {(x1, y1), (x1, y2), (x2, y1), (x2, y2)}, and one has:
∅ = (∅1, ∅2)
∅r1 = (∅1, y1)
∅r2 = (∅1, y2)
∅r3 = (∅1, y1 ∪ y2)
∅r4 = (x1, ∅2)
∅r5 = (x2, ∅2)
∅r6 = (x1 ∪ x2, ∅2)
and thus
∅gr = ∅ ∪ ∅r1 ∪ ∅r2 ∪ . . . ∪ ∅r6
Based on definition of joint frame Θ with operations
on its elements, we need to choose its underlying model
(Shafer’s, free or hybrid model) to define its fusion space
where the bba’s will be defined on. According to the
definition of absolute and relative minimal elements,
we then assume for the given VBIED problem that Θ
satisfies Shafer’s model, i.e. all (triplets) elements θi ∈
Θ are exclusive, so that the bba’s of sources will be
defined on the classical power-set 2Θ.
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2.3 Supporting hypotheses for decision
In the VBIED problem the main question (Q1) is re-
lated with the security of people in the building B. The
potential danger related with this building is of course
θ8 = (A, V,B) i.e. the presence of A in his/her car V
near the building B. This is however and unfortunately
not the only origin of the danger since the threat can
also come from the possible presence of V (possible A’s
improvised explosive vehicle) parked near the building
B even if A has left his/her car and is not himself/her-
self near the building. This second origin of danger
is represented by θ7 = (A¯, V, B). There exists also a
third origin of the danger represented by θ6 = (A, V¯ , B)
which reflects the possibility to have A near the build-
ing without V car. θ6 is also dangerous for the building
B since A can try to commit a suicidal terrorism attack
as human bomb against the building. Therefore based
on these three sources of potential danger, the most
reasonable/prudent supporting hypothesis for decision-
making is consider
θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 = (A, V¯ , B) ∪ (A¯, V, B) ∪ (A, V,B)
If we assume that the danger is mostly due to pres-
ence of A’s vehicle containing possibly a high charge of
explosive near the building B rather than the human
bomb attack, then one can prefer to consider only the
following hypothesis for decision-making support eval-
uation
θ7 ∪ θ8 = (A¯, V, B) ∪ (A, V,B)
Finally if we are more optimistic, we can consider
that the real danger occurs if and only if A drives V
near the building B and therefore one could consider
only the supporting hypothesis θ8 = (A, V,B) for the
danger in the decision-making support evaluation.
In the sequel, we adopt the worst scenario (we
take the most prudent choice) and we consider all
three origins of potential danger. Thus we will take
θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 as cautious/prudent supporting hypothesis
for decision-making.
Thepropositions θ6 ∪ θ8 = (A, V¯ , B) ∪ (A, V,B) and
θ6∪θ7 = (A, V¯ , B)∪(A¯, V, B) represent also a potential
danger and could serve as decision-support hypotheses
also, and their imprecise probabilities can be evaluate
easily following analysis presented in the sequel. They
have not been reported in this paper to keep it at a
reasonable size.
2.4 Choice of bba’s of sources
Let’s define first the bba of each source without re-
gard to what could be their reliability and importance
in the fusion process. Reliability and importance will
be examined in details in next section.
• Bba related with source 0 (prior information):
The prior information states that the suspect A
drives a white Toyota, and nothing is state about
the prior information with respect to his location,
so that we must consider the bba’s representing the
prior information as
m0(θ4 ∪ θ8) = m0((A, V, B¯) ∪ (A, V,B))
= m0((A, V,B ∪ B¯))
= 1
• Bba related with source 1 (Analyst 1 with 10
years experience): The source 1 reports that the
suspect A is probably now near the building B.
This source however doesn’t report explicitly that
the suspect A is still with its white Toyota car or
not. So the fair way to model this report when
working on Θ is to commit a high mass of belief to
the element θ6 ∪ θ8, that is
m1(θ6 ∪ θ8) = m1((A, V¯ , B) ∪ (A, V,B))
= m1((A, V ∪ V¯ , B))
= 0.75
and to commit the uncommitted mass to It based
on the principle of minimum of specificity, so that
m1(θ6 ∪ θ8) = 0.75 and m1(It) = 0.25
• Bba related with source 2 (ANPR system):
The source 3 reports 30% probability that the ve-
hicle is individual A’s wite Toyota. Nothing is re-
ported on the position information. The informa-
tion provided by this source corresponds actually
to incomplete probabilistic information. Indeed,
when working on Θ1 × Θ2, what we only know
is that P{(A, V )} = 0.3 and P{(A¯, V ) ∪ (A, V¯ ) ∪
(A¯, V¯ )} = 0.7 (from additivity axiom of probabil-
ity theory) and thus the bba m2(.) we must choose
on Θ1 × Θ2 × Θ3 has to be compatible with this
incomplete probabilistic information, i.e. the pro-
jection m′2(.) , m
↓Θ1×Θ2
2 (.) of m2(.) on Θ1 × Θ2
must satisfy the following constraints on belief and
plausibility functions
Bel′((A, V )) = 0.3
Bel′((A¯, V ) ∪ (A, V¯ ) ∪ (A¯, V¯ )) = 0.7
and also
Pl′((A, V )) = 0.3
Pl′((A¯, V ) ∪ (A, V¯ ) ∪ (A¯, V¯ )) = 0.7
because belief and plausibility correspond to lower
and upper bounds of probability measure [5]. So
it is easy to verify that the following bba m′2(.)
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satisfy these constraints because the elements of
the frame Θ1 ×Θ2 are exclusive:
m′2((A, V )) = 0.3
m′2((A¯, V ) ∪ (A, V¯ ) ∪ (A¯, V¯ )) = 0.7
We can then extend m′2(.) into Θ1×Θ2×Θ3 using
the minimum specificity principle (i.e. take the
vacuous extension of m′2(.)) to get the bba m2(.)
that we need to solve the VBIED problem. That
is m2(.) = m
′↑Θ1×Θ2×Θ3
2 (.) with
m2((A, V,B ∪ B¯)) = 0.3
m2((A¯, V, B∪B¯)∪(A, V¯ , B∪B¯)∪(A¯, V¯ , B∪B¯)) = 0.7
or equivalently
m2(θ4 ∪ θ8) = 0.3
m2(θ4 ∪ θ8) = m2(θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ θ3 ∪ θ5 ∪ θ6 ∪ θ7) = 0.7
• Bba related with source 3 (Analyst 3 with no
experience): The source 3 reports that it is im-
probable that the suspect A is near the building
B. This source however doesn’t report explicitly
that the suspect A is still with its white Toyota
car or not. So the fair way to model this report
when working on Θ is to commit a low mass of
belief to the element θ6 ∪ θ8, that is
m3(θ6 ∪ θ8) = m3((A, V¯ , B) ∪ (A, V,B))
= m3((A, V ∪ V¯ , B))
= 0.25
and to commit the uncommitted mass to It based
on the principle of minimum of specificity, so that
m3(θ6 ∪ θ8) = 0.25 and m3(It) = 0.75
2.5 Reliability of sources
Let’s identify what is known about the reliability of
sources and information:
• Reliability of prior information: it is (implic-
itly) supposed that the prior information is 100%
reliable that is ”Suspect A drives a white Toy-
ota” which corresponds to the element (A, V,B) ∪
(A, V, B¯). So we can take the reliability factor of
prior information as α0 = 1. If one considers the
priori information highly reliable (but not totally
reliable) then one could take α0 = 0.9 so thatm0(.)
would be
m0(θ4 ∪ θ8) = 0.9 and m0(It) = 0.1
• Reliability of source 1: One knows that Analyst
# 1 has 10 years experience, so we must consider
him/her having a good reliability (say greater than
75%) or to be less precise we can just assign to him
a qualitative reliability factor with minimal num-
ber of labels in {L1 = not good, L2 = good}. Here
we should choose α1 = L2. As first approximation,
we can consider α1 = 1.
• Reliability of source 2: No information about
the reliability of ANPR system is explicitly given.
We may consider that if such device is used it is
because it is also considered as a valuable tool and
thus we assume it has a good reliability too, that
is α2 = 1. If we want to be more prudent we
should consider the reliability factor of this source
as totally unknown and thus we should take it as
very imprecise with α2 = [0, 1] (or qualitatively as
α2 = [L0, L3]). If we are more optimistic and con-
sider ANPR system as reliable enough, we could
take α2 a bit more precise with α2 = [0.75, 1] (i.e.
α2 ≥ 0.75) or just qualitatively as α2 = L2.
• Reliability of source 3: It is said explicitly that
Analyst 2 is new in post, which means that Ana-
lyst 2 has no great experience and it can be inferred
logically that it is less reliable than Analyst 1 so
that we must choose α3 < α1. But we can also
have a very young brillant analyst who perform
very well too with respect to the older Analyst 1.
So to be more cautious/prudent, we should also
consider the case of unknown reliability factor α3
by taking qualitatively α3 = [L0, L3] or quantita-
tively by taking α3 as a very imprecise value that
is α3 = [0, 1].
2.6 Importance of sources
Not that much is explicitly said about the importance
of the sources of information in the VBIED problem
statement, but the fact that Analyst 1 has ten years
experience and Analyst 2 is new in post, so that it seems
logical to choose as importance factor β1 > β3. The
importances discounting factors have been introduced
and presented by the authors in [2, 7]. As a prudent
attitude we could choose also β0 = [0, 1] = [L0, L3]
and β2 = [0, 1] = [L0, L3] (vey imprecise values). If
we consider that the prior information and the source 2
(ANPR) have the same importance, we could just take
β0 = β1 = 1 to make derivations easier and adopt a
more optimistic point of view1.
3 Solution of VBIED problem
We apply PCR5 and PCR6 fusion rules developed
originally in the DSmT framework to get the solution
1Of course the importance discounting factors can also be
chosen approximatively from exogenous information upon the
desiderata of the fusion system designer. This question is out
of the scope of this paper.
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of the VBIED problem. PCR5 has been developed
by the authors in [6], Vol.2, and PCR6 is a variant
of PCR5 proposed by Arnaud Martin and Christophe
Osswald in [3]. Several codes for using PCR5 and
PCR6 have been proposed in the literature for example
in [3, 1, 7] and are available to the authors upon request.
Two cases are explored depending on the taking into
account or not of the reliability and the importance of
sources in the fusion process. To simplify the presenta-
tion of the results we denote the focal elements involved
in this VBIED problem as:
f1 , θ4 ∪ θ8
f2 , θ6 ∪ θ8
f3 , θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ θ3 ∪ θ5 ∪ θ6 ∪ θ7 = θ4 ∪ θ8
f4 , It = θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ θ3 ∪ θ4 ∪ θ5 ∪ θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8
Only these focal elements are involved in inputs of
the problem and we recall the two questions that we
must answer:
Question 1 (Q1): Should building B be evacuated?
The question 1 must be answered by analyzing
the level of belief and plausibility committed in the
propositions supporting B through the fusion process.
Question 2 (Q2): Is experience (Analyst 1) more
valuable than physics (the ANPR system) combined
with inexperience (Analyst 2)? How do we model that?
The question 2 must be answered by analyzing and
comparing the results of the fusion m1 ⊕m3 (or even-
tually m0 ⊕m1 ⊕ m3) with respect to m2 only (resp.
m0 ⊕m2).
3.1 Without reliability and importance
We provide here the solutions of the VBIED problem
with direct PCR5 and PCR6 fusion of the sources
for different qualitative inputs summarized in the
tables below. We also present the result of DSmP
probabilistic transformation [6] (Vol.3, Chap. 3) of
resulting bba’s to get and approximate probability
measure of elements of Θ. No importance and reliabil-
ity discounting has been applied since in this section,
we consider that all sources have same importances
and same reliabilities.
Example 1: We take the bba’s described in section
2.3, that is
focal element m0(.) m1(.) m2(.) m3(.)
θ4 ∪ θ8 1 0 0.3 0
θ6 ∪ θ8 0 0.75 0 0.25
θ4 ∪ θ8 0 0 0.7 0
It 0 0.25 0 0.75
Table 1: Quantitative inputs of VBIED problem.
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ θ3 ∪ θ5 ∪ θ6 ∪ θ7 0.19741 0.16811
θ8 0.24375 0.24375
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.33826 0.29641
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.11029 0.14587
It 0.11029 0.14587
Table 2: Results of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 1.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0333 0.0286
θ2 0.0333 0.0286
θ3 0.0333 0.0286
θ4 0.0018 0.0018
θ5 0.0333 0.0286
θ6 0.0338 0.0292
θ7 0.0333 0.0286
θ8 0.7977 0.8260
Table 3: DSmPǫ of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 1.
Singletons BetPPCR5(.) BetPPCR6(.)
θ1 0.0467 0.0463
θ2 0.0467 0.0463
θ3 0.0467 0.0463
θ4 0.1829 0.1664
θ5 0.0467 0.0463
θ6 0.1018 0.1192
θ7 0.0467 0.0463
θ8 0.4818 0.4831
Table 4: BetP of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 1.
From fusion result of Table 2, one gets for the danger
supporting hypothesis θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 (the worst scenario
case)
• with PCR5: ∆(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.64596
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.35404, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.64596]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.61038
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.38962, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.61038]
where ∆(X) = Pl(X) − Bel(X) is the impre-
cision related to P (X). It is worth to note
that ∆(X¯) = Pl(X¯) − Bel(X¯) = ∆(X) because
Pl(X¯) = 1− Bel(X) and Bel(X¯) = 1− Pl(X).
If we consider only θ7 ∪ θ8 = (A¯, V, B) ∪ (A, V,B)
as danger supporting hypothesis then from the fusion
result of Table 2, one gets
• with PCR5: ∆(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.75625
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.24375, 1]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.75625]
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• with PCR6: ∆(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.75625
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.24375, 1]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.75625]
If we are more optimistic and we consider only the
danger supporting hypothesis θ8, then one gets
• with PCR5: ∆(θ8) = 0.55884
P (θ8) ∈ [0.24375, 0.80259]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.19741, 0.75625]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ8) = ∆(θ¯8) = 0.58814
P (θ8) ∈ [0.24375, 0.83189]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.16811, 0.75625]
If one approximates the bba’s into probabilistic mea-
sures with DSmP transformation2, one gets results with
ǫ = 0.001 presented in Table 3. One gets the higher
probability on θ8 with respect to other alternatives and
also DSmP (θ6∪θ7∪θ8) = 0.8648. If one prefers to use
the pignistic3 probability transformation [8], one gets
the results given in Table 4. One sees clearly that PIC4
of DSmP is higher that PIC of BetP which makes deci-
sion easier to take with DSmP than with BetP in favor
of θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8, or θ7 ∪ θ8, or θ8.
- Answer to Q1: One sees that the result pro-
vided by PCR6 and PCR5 are very close and
do not change fundamentally the final decision to
take. Based on these very imprecise results, it
is very difficult to take the right decision with-
out decision-making error because the sources of
information are highly uncertain and conflicting,
but the analysis of lower and upper bounds shows
that the most reasonable answer to the ques-
tion based either on max of credibility or max
of plausibility is to evacuate the building B since
Bel(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) > Bel(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) and also
Pl(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) > Pl(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8). The same
conclusion is drawn when considering the element
θ7 ∪ θ8 or θ8 alone. The same conclusion also is
drawn (more easier) based on DSmP or on BetP
values. In summary, the answer to Q1 is: Evacu-
ation of the building B.
2DSmP transformation has been introduced and justified in
details by the authors in the book [6] (Vol.3, Chap. 3) freely
downloadable from the web with many examples, and therefore
it will not be presented here.
3BetP is the most used transformation to approximate a mass
of belief into a subjective probability measure. It has been pro-
posed by Philippe Smets in nineties.
4The PIC (probabilistic information content) criteria has been
introduced by John Sudano in [9] and is noting but the dual of
normalized Shannon entropy. PIC is in [0, 1] and PIC = 1 if the
probability measure assigns a probability one only on a particular
singleton of the frame, and PIC = 0 if all elements of the frame
are equi-probable.
In order to answer to the second question (Q2), let’s
compute the fusion results of the fusion m0 ⊕m2 and
m0⊕m1⊕m3 using inputs given in Table 1. The fusion
results with corresponding DSmP and BetP are given
in the Tables 5-6.
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ θ3 ∪ θ5 ∪ θ6 ∪ θ7 0.28824 0.28824
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.71176 0.71176
Table 5: Result of m0 ⊕m2.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0480 0.0480
θ2 0.0480 0.0480
θ3 0.0480 0.0480
θ4 0.3560 0.3560
θ5 0.0480 0.0480
θ6 0.0480 0.0480
θ7 0.0480 0.0480
θ8 0.3560 0.3560
Table 6: DSmPǫ of m0 ⊕m2.
Singletons BetPPCR5(.) BetPPCR6(.)
θ1 0.0480 0.0480
θ2 0.0480 0.0480
θ3 0.0480 0.0480
θ4 0.3560 0.3560
θ5 0.0480 0.0480
θ6 0.0480 0.0480
θ7 0.0480 0.0480
θ8 0.3560 0.3560
Table 7: BetP of m0 ⊕m2.
Based on m0 ⊕ m2 fusion result, one gets a total
imprecision ∆02(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 1 when considering
θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 or θ7 ∪ θ8 since
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
and
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
Even when considering only the danger supporting hy-
pothesis θ8, one still gets a quite large imprecision on
P (θ8) since ∆02(θ8) = 0.71176 with
P (θ8) ∈ [0, 0.71176]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.28824, 1]
Based on max of Bel or max of Pl criteria, one sees
that it is not possible to take any rational decision from
θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 nor θ7 ∪ θ8 because of the full imprecision
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range of P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) or P (θ7 ∪ θ8). The decision
using m0 ⊕ m2 (i.e. with prior information m0 and
ANPR systemm2) based only on supporting hypothesis
θ8 should be to NOT evacuate the building B. Same
decision would be taken based on DSmP or BetP values.
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ8 0.8125 0.8125
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.1875 0.1875
Table 8: Result of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0 0
θ2 0 0
θ3 0 0
θ4 0.0002 0.0002
θ5 0 0
θ6 0 0
θ7 0 0
θ8 0.9998 0.9998
Table 9: DSmPǫ of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
Singletons BetPPCR5(.) BetPPCR6(.)
θ1 0 0
θ2 0 0
θ3 0 0
θ4 0.09375 0.09375
θ5 0 0
θ6 0 0
θ7 0 0
θ8 0.90625 0.90625
Table 10: BetP of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
Based on m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m3 fusion result, one gets
∆013(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.1875
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.8125, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.1875]
but also
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.8125, 1], P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.1875]
and
P (θ8) ∈ [0.8125, 1], P (θ¯8) ∈ [0, 0.1875]
Based on max of Bel or max of Pl criteria, the deci-
sion usingm0⊕m1⊕m3 (i.e. with prior informationm0
and both analysts) is to evacuate the building B. The
same decision is taken based on DSmP or BetP values.
It is worth to note that the precision on the result ob-
tained with m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m3 is much better than with
m0 ⊕m2 since ∆013(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) < ∆02(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8),
or ∆013(θ7 ∪ θ8) < ∆02(θ7 ∪ θ8). Moreover it is easy to
verify that m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3 fusion system is more infor-
mative than m0 ⊕m2 fusion system because Shannon
entropy of DSmP ofm0⊕m2 is much bigger than Shan-
non entropy of DSmP of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
- Answer to Q2: Since the information obtained
by the fusion m0 ⊕m2 is less informative and less
precise than the information obtained with the
fusion m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m3, it is better to choose and
to trust the fusion system m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m3 rather
than m0 ⊕ m2. Based on this choice, the final
decision will be to evacuate the building B which
is consistent with answer to question Q1.
Example 2: Let’s modify a bit the previous Table 1
and take higher belief for sources 1 and 3 as
focal element m0(.) m1(.) m2(.) m3(.)
θ4 ∪ θ8 1 0 0.3 0
θ6 ∪ θ8 0 0.9 0 0.1
θ4 ∪ θ8 0 0 0.7 0
It 0 0.1 0 0.9
Table 11: Quantitative inputs of VBIED problem.
The results of the fusion m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m2 ⊕ m3 using
PCR5 and PCR6 and the corresponding DSmP values
are given in tables 12-13.
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ θ3 ∪ θ5 ∪ θ6 ∪ θ7 0.16525 0.14865
θ8 0.27300 0.27300
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.26307 0.23935
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.14934 0.16950
It 0.14934 0.16950
Table 12: Results of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 11.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0281 0.0254
θ2 0.0281 0.0254
θ3 0.0281 0.0254
θ4 0.0015 0.0015
θ5 0.0281 0.0254
θ6 0.0286 0.0260
θ7 0.0281 0.0254
θ8 0.8294 0.8455
Table 13: DSmPǫ of m0⊕m1 ⊕m2⊕m3 for Table 11.
From fusion result of Table 12, one gets when consid-
ering θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8
• with PCR5: ∆(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.57766
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.42234, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 57766]
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Singletons BetPPCR5(.) BetPPCR6(.)
θ1 0.0462 0.0460
θ2 0.0462 0.0460
θ3 0.0462 0.0460
θ4 0.1502 0.1409
θ5 0.0462 0.0460
θ6 0.1209 0.1307
θ7 0.0462 0.0460
θ8 0.4979 0.4986
Table 14: BetP of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 11.
• with PCR6: ∆(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.5575
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.4425, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.5575]
and when considering θ7 ∪ θ8
• with PCR5: ∆(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.7270
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.27300, 1], P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.7270]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.7270
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.27300, 1], P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.7270]
and when considering θ8 only
• with PCR5 or PCR6: ∆(θ8) = 0.56175
P (θ8) ∈ [0.27300, 0.83475]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.16525, 0.7270]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ8) = 0.57835
P (θ8) ∈ [0.27300, 0.85135]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.14865, 0.7270]
One gets also the following DSmPǫ=0.001 values
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.8861
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.8869
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.8575
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.8709
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ8) = 0.8294
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ8) = 0.8455
- Answer to Q1: Using an analysis similar to the
one done for Example 1, based on max of credibil-
ity or max of plausibility criteria, or by considering
the DSmP or BetP values of θ6∪θ7∪θ8, or θ7∪θ8,
or θ8 the decision to take is: Evacuate the build-
ing B.
In order to answer to the second question (Q2) for
this Example 2, let’s compute the fusion results of the
fusion m0 ⊕m2 and m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3 using inputs given
in Table 11. Since the inputs m0 and m2 are the same
as those in Example 1, the m0⊕m2 fusion results with
corresponding DSmP are those already given in Tables
5-7. Only the fusion m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m3 must be derived
with the new bba’s m1 and m3 chosen for this Example
2. The m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m3 fusion results obtained with
PCR5 and PCR6, and the corresponding DSmP and
BetP values are shown in Tables 15-17. According to
these results, one gets with the PCR5 or PCR6 fusion
m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3: ∆013(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = ∆013(θ7 ∪ θ8) =
∆013(θ8) = 0.09 and
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.91, 1], P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.09]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.91, 1], P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.09]
P (θ8) ∈ [0.91, 1], P (θ¯8) ∈ [0, 0.09]
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ8 0.91 0.91
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.09 0.09
Table 15: Result of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0 0
θ2 0 0
θ3 0 0
θ4 0.0001 0.0001
θ5 0 0
θ6 0 0
θ7 0 0
θ8 0.9999 0.9999
Table 16: DSmPǫ of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
Singletons BetPPCR5(.) BetPPCR6(.)
θ1 0 0
θ2 0 0
θ3 0 0
θ4 0.045 0.045
θ5 0 0
θ6 0 0
θ7 0 0
θ8 0.955 0.955
Table 17: BetP of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
Based on max of Bel or max of Pl criteria, the deci-
sion using m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3 (i.e. with prior information
m0 and both analysts) is to evacuate the building B.
Same decision is taken based on DSmP or BetP values.
It is worth to note that the precision on the result ob-
tained with m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m3 is much better than with
m0 ⊕m2 since ∆013(θ8) < ∆02(θ8), or ∆013(θ7 ∪ θ8) <
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∆02(θ7 ∪ θ8), or ∆013(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) < ∆02(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8).
Moreover it is easy to verify that m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3 fusion
system is more informative than m0⊕m2 fusion system
because Shannon entropy of DSmP of m0⊕m2 is much
bigger than Shannon entropy of DSmP ofm0⊕m1⊕m3.
Same remark holds with BetP transformation.
- Answer to Q2: Since the information obtained
by the fusion m0 ⊕m2 is less informative and less
precise than the information obtained with the fu-
sion m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3, it is better to choose and to
trust the fusion system m0⊕m1⊕m3 rather than
m0 ⊕m2. Based on this choice, the final decision
will be to evacuate the building B which is consis-
tent with the answer of the question Q1.
3.2 Impact of prior information
To see the impact of the quality/reliability of prior
information on the result, let’s modify the input m0(.)
in previous Tables 1 and 11 and consider now a very
uncertain prior source.
Example 3: We consider the very uncertain
prior source of information m0(θ4 ∪ θ8) = 0.1
and m0(It) = 0.9. The results for the modified inputs
Table 18 ate given in Tables 19 and 20.
focal element m0(.) m1(.) m2(.) m3(.)
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.1 0 0.3 0
θ6 ∪ θ8 0 0.75 0 0.25
θ4 ∪ θ8 0 0 0.7 0
It 0.9 0.25 0 0.75
Table 18: Quantitative inputs of VBIED problem.
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ6 0.511870 0.511870
θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ θ3 ∪ θ5 ∪ θ6 ∪ θ7 0.151070 0.142670
θ8 0.243750 0.243750
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.060957 0.059757
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.016173 0.020973
It 0.016173 0.020973
Table 19: Result of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 18.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0003 0.0003
θ2 0.0003 0.0003
θ3 0.0003 0.0003
θ4 0.0003 0.0003
θ5 0.0003 0.0003
θ6 0.6833 0.6815
θ7 0.0003 0.0003
θ8 0.3149 0.3168
Table 20: DSmPǫ of m0⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 18.
Singletons BetPPCR5(.) BetPPCR6(.)
θ1 0.0272 0.0264
θ2 0.0272 0.0264
θ3 0.0272 0.0264
θ4 0.0325 0.0325
θ5 0.0272 0.0264
θ6 0.5472 0.5488
θ7 0.0272 0.0264
θ8 0.2843 0.2867
Table 21: BetP of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 18.
From the fusion result of Table 19, one gets when con-
sidering θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8
• with PCR5: ∆(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.221377
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.778623, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.221377]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.21465
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.78535, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.21465]
and when considering θ7 ∪ θ8
• with PCR5: ∆(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.24438
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.24375, 0.48813]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.51187, 0.75625]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.24438
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.24375, 0.48813]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.51187, 0.75625]
and when considering θ8 only, one has
• with PCR5: ∆(θ8) = 0.09331
P (θ8) ∈ [0.24375, 0.33706]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.66294, 0.75625]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ8) = 0.10171
P (θ8) ∈ [0.24375, 0.34546]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.65454, 0.75625]
Using DSmP transformation, one gets a low probability
in θ8 or in θ7 ∪ θ8 because
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.9985
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.9986
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.3152
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.3171
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ8) = 0.3149
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ8) = 0.3168
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- Answer to Q1: The analysis of these results are
very interesting since one sees that the element of
the frame Θ having the highest DSmP (or BetP)
is θ6 = (A, V¯ , B) and it has a very strong impact
on the final decision. Because if one considers only
θ8 or θ7 ∪ θ8 has decision-support hypotheses, one
sees that the decision to take is to NOT evacuate
the building B since one gets a low probability in
θ8 or in θ7∪θ8. Whereas if we include also θ6 in the
decision-support hypothesis, then the final decision
will be the opposite sinceDSmP (θ6∪θ7∪θ8) is very
close to one with PCR5 or with PCR6. The same
behavior occurs with BetP. So there is a strong im-
pact of prior information on the final decision since
without strong prior information supporting θ4∪θ8
we have to conclude either to the non evacuation
of building B based on the max of credibility, the
max of plausibility or the max of DSmP using θ8
or θ7∪θ8 for decision-making, or to the evacuation
of the building if a more prudent strategy is used
based on θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 decision-support hypothesis.
Let’s examine the results of fusion systems m0 ⊕m2
and m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3 given in Tables 22-27.
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ θ3 ∪ θ5 ∪ θ6 ∪ θ7 0.69125 0.69125
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.30875 0.30875
Table 22: Result of m0 ⊕m2.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.1152 0.1152
θ2 0.1152 0.1152
θ3 0.1152 0.1152
θ4 0.1544 0.1544
θ5 0.1152 0.1152
θ6 0.1152 0.1152
θ7 0.1152 0.1152
θ8 0.1544 0.1544
Table 23: DSmPǫ of m0 ⊕m2.
Singletons BetPǫ,PCR5(.) BetPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.1152 0.1152
θ2 0.1152 0.1152
θ3 0.1152 0.1152
θ4 0.1544 0.1544
θ5 0.1152 0.1152
θ6 0.1152 0.1152
θ7 0.1152 0.1152
θ8 0.1544 0.1544
Table 24: BetP of m0 ⊕m2.
Based on m0 ⊕ m2 fusion result, one gets a large
imprecision on evaluation of probabilities of decision-
support hypotheses since for θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8, one has
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ8 0.08125 0.08125
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.01875 0.01875
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.73125 0.73125
It 0.16875 0.16875
Table 25: Result of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0019 0.0019
θ2 0.0019 0.0019
θ3 0.0019 0.0019
θ4 0.0021 0.0021
θ5 0.0019 0.0019
θ6 0.0107 0.0107
θ7 0.0019 0.0019
θ8 0.9778 0.9778
Table 26: DSmPǫ of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
Singletons BetPǫ,PCR5(.) BetPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0211 0.0211
θ2 0.0211 0.0211
θ3 0.0211 0.0211
θ4 0.0305 0.0305
θ5 0.0211 0.0211
θ6 0.3867 0.3867
θ7 0.0211 0.0211
θ8 0.4773 0.4773
Table 27: BetP of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
∆02(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 1 and
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
for θ7 ∪ θ8, one has also ∆02(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 1 with
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
and for θ8, one gets ∆02(θ8) = 0.30875 with
P (θ8) ∈ [0, 0.30875]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.69125, 1]
One sees that it is impossible to take a decision
when considering only θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 or θ7 ∪ θ8 because
of full imprecision of the corresponding probabilities.
However, based on max of Bel or max of Pl criteria
on θ8 the decision using m0 ⊕m2 (i.e. with uncertain
prior information m0 and ANPR system m2) is to
NOT evacuate the building B. According to Tables
23-24, one sees also an ambiguity in decision-making
between θ8 and θ4 since they have the same DSmP (or
BetP) values.
Page 10
Based on m0⊕m1⊕m3 fusion results given in Tables
25-27, one gets for θ6∪θ7∪θ8 the imprecision ∆013(θ6∪
θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.1875 with
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.8125, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.1875]
for θ7 ∪ θ8, one gets ∆013(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.91875 with
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.08125, 1]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.91875]
and for θ8, one gets ∆013(θ8) = 0.91875 with
P (θ8) ∈ [0.08125, 1]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0, 0.91875]
Based on max of Bel or max of Pl criteria, the deci-
sion usingm0⊕m1⊕m3 is the evacuation of the building
B. Same decision is drawn when using DSmP or BetP
results according to Tables 26 and 27. With this un-
certain prior information, it is worth to note that the
precision on the result obtained with m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3 is
better than withm0⊕m2 when considering (in cautious
strategy) the decision-support hypotheses θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8
or θ7∪θ8 since ∆013(θ6∪θ7∪θ8) < ∆02(θ6∪θ7∪θ8), or
∆013(θ7 ∪ θ8) < ∆02(θ7 ∪ θ8). However, if a more opti-
mistic/risky strategy is used when considering only θ8
as decision-support hypothesis, it is preferable to choose
the subsystem m0 ⊕ m2 because ∆02(θ8) < ∆013(θ8).
However, one sees that globally m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3 fusion
system is more informative than m0⊕m2 fusion system
because Shannon entropy of DSmP of m0⊕m2 is much
bigger than Shannon entropy of DSmP ofm0⊕m1⊕m3.
- Answer to Q2: The answer of question Q2 is
not easy because it depends both on the crite-
rion (precision or PIC) and on the decision-support
hypothesis we choose. Based on precision crite-
rion and taking the optimistic point of view using
only θ8, it is better to trust m0 ⊕ m2 fusion sys-
tem since ∆02(θ8) = ∆02(θ¯8) = 0.30875 whereas
∆013(θ8) = ∆013(θ¯8) = 0.9187. In such case, one
should NOT evacuate the building B. If we con-
sider that is better to trust result of m0⊕m1⊕m3
fusion system because it is more informative than
m0 ⊕m2 then the decision should be to evacuate
the building B. If we take a more prudent point of
view in considering as decision-support hypotheses
either θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 or θ7∪ θ8, then the final decision
taken according to the (most precise and informa-
tive) subsystem m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3 is to evacuate the
building B.
So the main open question is what solution to
choose for selecting eitherm0⊕m2 orm0⊕m1⊕m3
fusion system ? In authors opinion, in such case
it seems better to base our choice on the precision
level of information one has really in hands (rather
than the PIC value which is always related to some
ad-hoc probabilistic transformation) and in adopt-
ing the most prudent strategy. Therefore for this
example, the final decision must be done according
to m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3, i.e. evacuate the building B.
Example 4: Let’s modify a bit the previous input Ta-
ble 18 and take higher belief for sources 1 and 3 as
focal element m0(.) m1(.) m2(.) m3(.)
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.1 0 0.3 0
θ6 ∪ θ8 0 0.9 0 0.1
θ4 ∪ θ8 0 0 0.7 0
It 0.9 0.1 0 0.9
Table 28: Quantitative inputs of VBIED problem.
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ6 0.573300 0.573300
θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ θ3 ∪ θ5 ∪ θ6 ∪ θ7 0.082365 0.077355
θ8 0.273000 0.273000
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.030666 0.029951
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.020334 0.023197
It 0.020334 0.023197
Table 29: Result of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 28.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0002 0.0002
θ2 0.0002 0.0002
θ3 0.0002 0.0002
θ4 0.0001 0.0001
θ5 0.0002 0.0002
θ6 0.6824 0.6813
θ7 0.0002 0.0002
θ8 0.3166 0.3178
Table 30: DSmPǫ of m0⊕m1 ⊕m2⊕m3 for Table 28.
Singletons BetPPCR5(.) BetPPCR6(.)
θ1 0.0163 0.0158
θ2 0.0163 0.0158
θ3 0.0163 0.0158
θ4 0.0179 0.0179
θ5 0.0163 0.0158
θ6 0.5997 0.6007
θ7 0.0163 0.0158
θ8 0.3010 0.3025
Table 31: BetP of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 28.
Therefore, one gets when considering θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8
• with PCR5: ∆(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.133366
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.866634, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.133366]
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• with PCR6: ∆(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.130503
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.869497, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.130503]
and when considering θ7 ∪ θ8
• with PCR5: ∆(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.1537
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.2730, 0.4267]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.5733, 0.7270]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.1537
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.2730, 0.4267]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.5733, 0.7270]
and when considering θ8 only
• with PCR5: ∆(θ8) = 0.071335
P (θ8) ∈ [0.2730, 0.344335]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.655665, 0.7270]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ8) = 0.076345
P (θ8) ∈ [0.2730, 0.349345]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.650655, 0.7270]
Based on DSmP transformation, one gets a pretty
low probability on θ8 and on θ7 ∪ θ8, but a very high
probability on the most prudent decision-support fy-
pothesis θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 because
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.9992
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.9993
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.3168
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.3180
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ8) = 0.3166
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ8) = 0.3178
- Answer to Q1: Based on these results, one sees
that the decision based either on the max of credi-
bility, the max of plausibility or the max of DSmP
considering both cases θ8 or θ7 ∪ θ8 is to: NOT
Evacuate the building B, whereas the most pru-
dent/cautious strategy suggests the opposite, i.e.
the evacuation of the building B.
Let’s examine the results of fusion systems m0 ⊕m2
and m0⊕m1⊕m3 corresponding to the input Table 28.
Naturally, one gets same results for the fusion m0⊕m2
as in Example 3 and for the fusion m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3 one
gets:
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ8 0.091 0.091
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.009 0.009
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.819 0.819
It 0.081 0.081
Table 32: Result of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0008 0.0008
θ2 0.0008 0.0008
θ3 0.0008 0.0008
θ4 0.0009 0.0009
θ5 0.0008 0.0008
θ6 0.0096 0.0096
θ7 0.0008 0.0008
θ8 0.9854 0.9854
Table 33: DSmPǫ of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
Singletons BetPPCR5(.) BetPPCR6(.)
θ1 0.0101 0.0101
θ2 0.0101 0.0101
θ3 0.0101 0.0101
θ4 0.0146 0.0146
θ5 0.0101 0.0101
θ6 0.4196 0.4196
θ7 0.0101 0.0101
θ8 0.5151 0.5151
Table 34: BetP of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
As in Example 3, based onm0⊕m2 fusion result, one
gets a large imprecision on evaluation of probabilities
of decision-support hypotheses since for θ6∪θ7∪θ8, one
has ∆02(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 1 and
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
for θ7 ∪ θ8, one has also ∆02(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 1 with
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
and for θ8, one gets ∆02(θ8) = 0.30875 with
P (θ8) ∈ [0, 0.30875]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.69125, 1]
One sees that it is impossible to take a decision when
considering only θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 or θ7 ∪ θ8 because of full
imprecision of the corresponding probabilities. Based
on max of Bel or max of Pl criteria on θ8 the decision
using m0 ⊕ m2 is to NOT evacuate the building B.
According to Tables 23-24, an ambiguity appears in
decision-making between θ8 and θ4 since they have the
same DSmP (or BetP) values.
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Based on m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m3 fusion result, one gets
∆013(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.09 for θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 with
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.91, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.09]
and ∆013(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.9090 for θ7 ∪ θ8 with
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.091, 1]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.9090]
and ∆013(θ8) = 0.9090 for only θ8 with
P (θ8) ∈ [0.091, 1]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0, 0.9090]
Based on max of Bel or max of Pl criteria on either θ8,
θ7∪θ8 or θ6∪θ7∪θ8 the decision usingm0⊕m1⊕m3 must
be the evacuation of the building B. Same decision is
drawn using DSmP or BetP results according to Tables
33 and 34.
- Answer to Q2: Similar remarks and conclusions
to those given in Example 3 held also for Exam-
ple 4, i.e. it is better to adopt the most prudent
strategy (i.e. to consider θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 as decision-
support hypothesis) and to trust the most precise
fusion system with respect this hypothesis, which
is in this example the subsystem m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m3.
Based only on m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m3 the final decision
will be to evacuate the building B when one has in
hands such highly uncertain prior information m0.
3.3 Impact of no prior information
Example 5: Let’s examine the result of the fusion
process if one doesn’t include5 the prior information
m0(.) and if we combine directly only the three sources
m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 altogether with PCR5 or PCR6.
focal element m1(.) m2(.) m3(.)
θ4 ∪ θ8 0 0.3 0
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.75 0 0.25
θ4 ∪ θ8 0 0.7 0
It 0.25 0 0.75
Table 35: Quantitative inputs of VBIED problem.
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ6 0.56875 0.56875
θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ θ3 ∪ θ5 ∪ θ6 ∪ θ7 0.13125 0.13125
θ8 0.24375 0.24375
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.05625 0.05625
Table 36: Result of m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 35.
5Or equivalently we can take m0 as the vacuous bba corre-
sponding to m0(It) = 1 and to the fully ignorant prior source.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0002 0.0002
θ2 0.0002 0.0002
θ3 0.0002 0.0002
θ4 0.0002 0.0002
θ5 0.0002 0.0002
θ6 0.6989 0.6989
θ7 0.0002 0.0002
θ8 0.2998 0.2998
Table 37: DSmPǫ of m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 35.
Singletons BetPPCR5(.) BetPPCR6(.)
θ1 0.0219 0.0219
θ2 0.0219 0.0219
θ3 0.0219 0.0219
θ4 0.0281 0.0281
θ5 0.0219 0.0219
θ6 0.5906 0.5906
θ7 0.0219 0.0219
θ8 0.2719 0.2719
Table 38: BetP of m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 35.
One gets ∆(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.1875 for θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 with
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.8125, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.1875]
for θ7 ∪ θ8, one has also ∆(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.1875 with
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.24375, 0.43125]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.56875, 0.75625]
and for θ8, one gets ∆(θ8) = 0.05625 with
P (θ8) ∈ [0.24375, 0.3], P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.7, 0.75625]
The result presented in Table 36 is obviously the same
as the one we obtain by combining the sources m0 ⊕
m1 ⊕ m2 ⊕ m3 altogether when taking m0(.) as the
vacuous belief assignment, i.e. when m0(It) = 1.
- Answer to Q1: Based on results of Tables 36-38
the decision based on max of belief, max of plau-
sibility on either θ8 or θ7 ∪ θ8 is to NOT evacuate
building B. Same conclusions is obtained when an-
alyzing values of DSmP or BetP of θ8 or θ7 ∪ θ8.
However, if we adopt the most prudent strategy
based on decision-support hypothesis θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8
the decision will be to evacuate the building B
since DSmP (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.9989. So we see the
strong impact of the miss of prior information in
the decision-making support process (by compar-
ison between Example 1 and this example) when
adopting more risky strategies for decision-making
based either on θ7 ∪ θ8 or on θ8 only.
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Let’s compare now the source m2 with respect to the
m1⊕m3 fusion system when no prior information m0 is
used. Naturally, there is no need to fusion m2 since we
consider it alone. One has ∆2(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = ∆2(θ7 ∪
θ8) = 1 (i.e. the full imprecision on P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) and
on P (θ7 ∪ θ8)) whereas ∆2(θ8) = 0.3 with
P (θ8) ∈ [0, 0.3], P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.7, 1]
DSmP and BetP of m2(.) are the same since there is no
singleton as focal element for m2(.) - see Table 39.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) BetP (.)
θ1 0.1167 0.1167
θ2 0.1167 0.1167
θ3 0.1167 0.1167
θ4 0.1500 0.1500
θ5 0.1167 0.1167
θ6 0.1167 0.1167
θ7 0.1167 0.1167
θ8 0.1500 0.1500
Table 39: DSmPǫ and BetP of m2.
Based on max of Bel or max of Pl criteria on θ8 (op-
timistic/risky strategy) the decision using m2 (ANPR
system alone) should be to NOT evacuate the building
B. No decision can be taken using decision-support
hypotheses θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 or θ7 ∪ θ8, nor on DSmP or
BetP values since there is an ambiguity between θ8
and θ4.
Now if we combine m1 with m3 using PCR5 or
PCR6 we get6 results given in Tables 40 and 41.
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.8125 0.8125
It 0.1875 0.1875
Table 40: Result of m1 ⊕m3.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0234 0.0234
θ2 0.0234 0.0234
θ3 0.0234 0.0234
θ4 0.0234 0.0234
θ5 0.0234 0.0234
θ6 0.4297 0.4297
θ7 0.0234 0.0234
θ8 0.4297 0.4297
Table 41: DSmPǫ of m1 ⊕m3.
The values of BetP (.) are same as those of DSmP (.)
because there is no singleton as focal element of
m1 ⊕m3.
6Note that for two sources, PCR6 equals PCR5 [6], Vol.2.
Whence ∆13(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.1875 with
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.8125, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.1875]
and ∆13(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 1 with
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1], P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
and also ∆13(θ8) = 1 with
P (θ8) ∈ [0, 1], P (θ¯8) ∈ [0, 1]
Based on max of Bel or max of Pl criteria on θ6∪θ7∪
θ8, the decision using m1 ⊕m3 must be the evacuation
of the building B. Same decision must be drawn when
using DSmP results according to Table 41. No decision
can be drawn based only on θ8 or on θ7 ∪ θ8 because of
full imprecision on their corresponding probabilities.
- Answer to Q2: Similar remarks and conclusions
to those given in Example 3 held also for Example
5, i.e. it is better to trust the most precise source
for the most prudent decision-support hypothesis,
and to decide to evacuate the building B if one
has no prior information rather than using only
information based on APNR system.
Example 6: It can be easily verified that the same
analysis, remarks and conclusions for Q1 and Q2 as for
Example 5 also hold when considering the sources m1
and m3 corresponding to the following input Table
focal element m1(.) m2(.) m3(.)
θ4 ∪ θ8 0 0.3 0
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.90 0 0.10
θ4 ∪ θ8 0 0.7 0
It 0.10 0 0.90
Table 42: Quantitative inputs of VBIED problem.
3.4 Impact of reliability of sources
The reliability of sources (when known) can be easily
taken into using Shafer’s classical discounting technique
[5], p. 252, which consists in multiplying the masses of
focal elements by the reliability factor α, and trans-
ferring all the remaining discounted mass to the full
ignorance Θ. When α < 1, such very simple reliability
discounting technique discounts all focal elements with
the same factor α and it increases the non specificity of
the discounted sources since the mass committed to the
full ignorance always increases. When α = 1, no relia-
bility discounting occurs (the bba is kept unchanged).
Mathematically, Shafer’s discounting technique for tak-
ing into account the reliability factor α ∈ [0, 1] of a
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given source with a bba m(.) and a frame Θ is defined
by: {
mα(X) = α ·m(X), for X 6= Θ
mα(Θ) = α ·m(Θ) + (1− α)
(1)
Example 7: Let’s consider back the inputs of Table
28. The impact of strong unreliability of prior informa-
tion m0 has already been analyzed in Examples 3 and
4 by considering actually α0 = 0.1. Here we analyze
the impact of reliabilities of sources m0, m1, m2 and
m3 according presentation done in section 2.4 and we
choose the following set of reliability factors α0 = 0.9,
α1 = 0.75, α2 = 0.75 and α3 = 0.25. These values
have been chosen approximatively but they reflect the
fact that one has a very good confidence in our prior
information, a good confidence in sources 1 and 2, and
a low confidence in source 3. Let’s examine the change
in the fusion result of sources. Applying reliability
discounting technique [5], the new inputs correspond-
ing to the discounted bba’s by (1) are given in Table 43.
focal element mα0(.) mα1(.) mα2(.) mα3(.)
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.90 0 0.2250 0
θ6 ∪ θ8 0 0.5625 0 0.0625
θ4 ∪ θ8 0 0 0.5250 0
It 0.10 0.4375 0.2500 0.9375
Table 43: Discounted inputs with α0 = 0.9, α1 = 0.75,
α2 = 0.75 and α3 = 0.25.
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ6 0.030967 0.030967
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.13119 0.11037
θ8 0.26543 0.26543
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.37256 0.33686
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.063483 0.068147
It 0.13637 0.18822
Table 44: Result of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 43.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0040 0.0036
θ2 0.0040 0.0036
θ3 0.0040 0.0036
θ4 0.0018 0.0019
θ5 0.0040 0.0036
θ6 0.1655 0.1535
θ7 0.0040 0.0036
θ8 0.8126 0.8266
Table 45: DSmPǫ of m0⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 43.
From the fusion result of Table 44, one gets when
considering θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8:
• with PCR5: ∆(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.64012
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.35988, 1]
Singletons BetPPCR5(.) BetPPCR6(.)
θ1 0.0389 0.0419
θ2 0.0389 0.0419
θ3 0.0389 0.0419
θ4 0.2033 0.1920
θ5 0.0389 0.0419
θ6 0.1016 0.1070
θ7 0.0389 0.0419
θ8 0.5005 0.4915
Table 46: BetP of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 43.
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.64012]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.635456
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.364544, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.635456]
and when considering θ7 ∪ θ8
• with PCR5: ∆(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.703603
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.26543, 0.969033]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.030967, 0.73457]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.703603
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.26543, 0.969033]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.030967, 0.73457]
and when considering θ8 only
• with PCR5: ∆(θ8) = 0.572413
P (θ8) ∈ [0.26543, 0.837843]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.162157, 0.73457]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ8) = 0.593233
P (θ8) ∈ [0.26543, 0.858663]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.141337, 0.73457]
Using DSmP transformation, one gets high probabil-
ities in θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8, θ7 ∪ θ8 and in θ8 because
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.9821
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.9837
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.8166
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.8302
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ8) = 0.8126
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ8) = 0.8266
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- Answer to Q1: Based on these results, one sees
that the decision to take is to evacuate the build-
ing B since one gets a high probability in decision-
support hypotheses. Same conclusion is drawn
when using max of Bel of max of Pl criteria. So
there is a little impact of reliability discounting on
the final decision with respect to Example 1. It is
however worth to note that introducing reliability
discounting increases the non specificity of infor-
mation since now It is a new focal element of mα0
and of mα2 and in the final result we get the new
focal element θ6 appearing with PCR5 or PCR6
fusion rules. This θ6 focal element doesn’t exist in
Example 1 when no reliability discounting is used.
The decision to take in this case is to: Evacuate
the building B.
To answer to the question Q2 for this Example 7,
let’s compute the fusion results of the fusion m0 ⊕m2
and m0⊕m1⊕m3 using inputs given in Table 43. The
fusion results with corresponding DSmP are given in
the Tables 47-50.
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.74842 0.74842
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.22658 0.22658
It 0.025 0.025
Table 47: Result of m0 ⊕m2.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0409 0.0409
θ2 0.0409 0.0409
θ3 0.0409 0.0409
θ4 0.3773 0.3773
θ5 0.0409 0.0409
θ6 0.0409 0.0409
θ7 0.0409 0.0409
θ8 0.3773 0.3773
Table 48: DSmPǫ of m0 ⊕m2.
The result of BetP transformation is the same as
with DSmP transformation since there is no singleton
element as focal element of the resulting bba’s when
using PCR5 or PCR6 fusion rule.
Based on m0 ⊕ m2 fusion result, one gets a large
imprecision7 on P (θ8) since ∆02(θ8) = 0.77342 with
P (θ8) ∈ [0, 0.77342]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.22658, 1]
7This imprecision is larger than in Example 1 which is normal
because one has degraded the information of both prior and the
source m2.
and one gets a total imprecision when considering either
θ7 ∪ θ8 or θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 since
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1], P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1], P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 1]
Based on max of bel or max of Pl criteria the
decision using m0 ⊕ m2 (i.e. with discounted sources
m0 and ANPR system m2) should be to NOT evacuate
the building B when working with decision-support
hypothesis θ8. No clear decision can be taken when
working with θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 or θ7 ∪ θ8. Ambiguity in
decision-making occurs between θ8 = (A, V,B) and
θ4 = (A, V, B¯) when using DSmP or BetP transforma-
tions.
Let’s examine now the result of the m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m3
fusion given in Tables 49 and 50.
focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ8 0.53086 0.53086
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.36914 0.36914
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.058984 0.058984
It 0.041016 0.041016
Table 49: Result of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0001 0.0001
θ2 0.0001 0.0001
θ3 0.0001 0.0001
θ4 0.0008 0.0008
θ5 0.0001 0.0001
θ6 0.0002 0.0002
θ7 0.0001 0.0001
θ8 0.9987 0.9987
Table 50: DSmPǫ of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
Singletons BetPPCR5(.) BetPPCR6(.)
θ1 0.0051 0.0051
θ2 0.0051 0.0051
θ3 0.0051 0.0051
θ4 0.1897 0.1897
θ5 0.0051 0.0051
θ6 0.0346 0.0346
θ7 0.0051 0.0051
θ8 0.7500 0.7500
Table 51: BetP of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3.
One sees clearly the impact of reliability discount-
ing on the specificity of information provided by the
fusion of sources. Indeed when using the discounting
of sources (mainly because we introduce It as focal el-
ement for m0) one gets now 4 focal elements whereas
we did get only two focal elements when no discounting
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was used (see Table 9). Based on m0⊕m1⊕m3 fusion
result, one gets ∆013(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.410156 with
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.589844, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.410156]
and also ∆013(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.46914 with
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.53086, 1]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.46914]
and ∆013(θ8) = 0.46914 with
P (θ8) ∈ [0.53086, 1]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0, 0.46914]
Based on max of Bel or max of Pl, the decision using
m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕m3 should be to evacuate the building B.
Same decision would be taken based on DSmP values.
It is worth to note that the precision on the result ob-
tained with m0 ⊕ m1 ⊕ m3 is much better than with
m0 ⊕m2 since ∆013(θ8) < ∆02(θ8), or ∆013(θ7 ∪ θ8) <
∆02(θ7 ∪ θ8), or ∆013(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) < ∆02(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8).
Moreover it is easy to verify that m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3 fusion
system is more informative than m0⊕m2 fusion system
because Shannon entropy of DSmP of m0⊕m2 is much
bigger than Shannon entropy of DSmP ofm0⊕m1⊕m3.
- Answer to Q2: Since the information obtained
by the fusion m0 ⊕m2 is less informative and less
precise than the information obtained with the
fusion m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m3, it is better to choose and to
trust the fusion system m0⊕m1⊕m3 rather than
m0 ⊕m2. Based on this choice, the final decision
will be to evacuate the building B.
3.5 Impact of importance of sources
The importance discounting technique has been pro-
posed recently by the authors in [7] and consists in
discounting the masses of focal elements by a factor
β ∈ [0, 1] and in transferring the remaining mass to
empty set, i.e.{
mβ(X) = β ·m(X), for X 6= ∅
mβ(∅) = β ·m(∅) + (1− β)
(2)
It has been proved in [7] that such importance dis-
counting technique preserves the specificity of the
information and that Dempster’s rule of combination
doesn’t respond to such new interesting discounting
technique specially useful and crucial in multicriteria
decision-making support.
In the extreme case, the method proposed in [7] re-
inforces the highest mass of the focal element of the
source having the biggest importance factor as soon as
the other sources have their importance factors tending
towards zero. This reinforcement may be a disputable
behavior. To avoid such behavior, we propose here to
use the same importance discounting technique, but the
fusion of discounted sources is done a bit differently in
three steps as follows:
• Step 1: Discount each source with its importance
discounting factor according to (2).
• Step 2: Apply PCR5 or PCR6 fusion rule with
unnormalized discounted bba’s, i.e. as if the dis-
counted mass committed to empty set for each
source was zero.
• Step 3: Normalize the result to get the sum of
masses of focal elements to be one.
Let’s examine the impact of the importance of the
sources in the fusion process for final decision-making
through the next very simple illustrating example.
Example 8: To evaluate this we consider the same
inputs as in Table 1 and we consider that source 1
(Analyst 1 with 10 years experience) is much more im-
portant than source 3 (Analyst 2 with no experience).
To reflect the difference between importance of this
sources we consider the following relative importance
factors β1 = 0.9 and β3 = 0.5. We also assume that
source 0 (prior information) and source 2 (ANPR
system) have the same maximal importance, i.e.
β0 = β2 = 1, i.e β = (β0, β1, β2, β3) = (1, 0.9, 1, 0.5).
These values have been chosen approximatively but
they do reflect the fact that sources m0 and m2
have same importance in the fusion process, and
that sources m1 and m3 may have less importance
in the fusion process taking into the fact that m3
is considered as less important than m1. Let’s ex-
amine the change in the fusion result of sources in
this example with respect to what we get in Example 1.
In applying importance discounting technique [7]
with the aforementioned fusion approach, the new in-
puts corresponding to the discounted (unnormalized)
bba’s by (2) are given in Table 52.
focal element mβ0(.) mβ1(.) mβ2(.) mβ3(.)
∅ 0 0.1 0 0.5
θ4 ∪ θ8 1 0 0.70 0
θ6 ∪ θ8 0 0.675 0 0.125
θ4 ∪ θ8 0 0 0.30 0
It 0 0.225 0 0.375
Table 52: Discounted inputs with β0 = 1, β1 = 0.9,
β2 = 1 and β3 = 0.5.
and the fusion result is given in Table 53.
As we can see, the importance discounting doesn’t
degrade the specificity of sources since no mass is
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focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ8 0.24375 0.24375
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.36788 0.33034
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.10552 0.14132
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.21814 0.19186
It 0.064701 0.092734
Table 53: Result of mβ0 ⊕mβ1 ⊕mβ2 ⊕mβ3 .
committed to partial ignorances, and it doesn’t also in-
crease the number of focal elements of the resulting bba
contrariwise to the reliability discounting approach.
Indeed in Table 53 one gets only 5 focal elements
whereas one gets 6 focal elements with reliability
discounting as shown in Table 44 of Example 7. The
corresponding DSmP and BetP values of bba’s given
in Table 53 are summarized in Tables 54 and 55 .
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0366 0.0323
θ2 0.0366 0.0323
θ3 0.0366 0.0323
θ4 0.0018 0.0017
θ5 0.0366 0.0323
θ6 0.0370 0.0329
θ7 0.0366 0.0323
θ8 0.7781 0.8036
Table 54: DSmPǫ of mβ0 ⊕mβ1 ⊕mβ2 ⊕mβ3 .
Singletons BetPPCR5(.) BetPPCR6(.)
θ1 0.0444 0.0436
θ2 0.0444 0.0436
θ3 0.0444 0.0436
θ4 0.1920 0.1768
θ5 0.0444 0.0436
θ6 0.0972 0.1142
θ7 0.0444 0.0436
θ8 0.4885 0.4912
Table 55: BetP of mβ0 ⊕mβ1 ⊕mβ2 ⊕mβ3 .
From the fusion result of Table 53, one gets when con-
sidering θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8
• with PCR5: ∆(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.65073
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.34927, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.65073]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.61493
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.38507, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.61493]
and when considering θ7 ∪ θ8
• with PCR5: ∆(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.75625
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.24375, 1]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.75625]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.75625
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.24375, 1]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.75625]
and when considering θ8 only
• with PCR5: ∆(θ8) = 0.53811
P (θ8) ∈ [0.24375, 0.78186]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.21814, 0.75625]
• with PCR6: ∆(θ8) = 0.564393
P (θ8) ∈ [0.24375, 0.80814]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.19186, 0.75625]
Using DSmP transformation, one gets a high proba-
bility in decision-support hypotheses because
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.8517
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.8688
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.8147
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.8359
DSmPǫ,PCR5(θ8) = 0.7781
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ8) = 0.8036
- Answer to Q1: Based on these results, one sees
that the decision to take based either on max of
Bel or max of Pl on θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8, on θ7 ∪ θ8 or on
θ8 only, or also based on DSmP, is to evacuate the
building B.
To answer to the question Q2 for this Example 8,
let’s compute the fusion results of the fusion mβ0 ⊕mβ2
and mβ0 ⊕mβ1 ⊕mβ3 using inputs given in Table 52.
Because one has considered β0 = β2 = 1, one does not
actually discount sources m0 and m2 and therefore the
m0 ⊕ m2 fusion results are already given in Tables 5
and 6 of Example 1. Therefore based on max of Bel or
max of Pl criteria on θ8 the decision using m0⊕m2 is to
NOT evacuate the building B since P (θ8) ∈ [0, 0.71176]
and P (θ¯8) ∈ [0.28824, 1] and ∆02(θ8) = 0.71176. Same
decision would be taken based on DSmP values with
the m0 ⊕m2 fusion sub-system.
Let’s now compute the fusion mβ0 ⊕mβ1 ⊕mβ3 with
the importance discounted sources mβ0=1 = m0, mβ1
and mβ3 . The fusion results are given in Tables 56, 57
and 58.
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focal element mPCR5(.) mPCR6(.)
θ8 0.8125 0.8125
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.1875 0.1875
Table 56: Result of mβ0 ⊕mβ1 ⊕mβ3 .
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR5(.) DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0 0
θ2 0 0
θ3 0 0
θ4 0.0002 0.0002
θ5 0 0
θ6 0 0
θ7 0 0
θ8 0.9998 0.9998
Table 57: DSmPǫ of mβ0 ⊕mβ1 ⊕mβ3 .
Singletons BetPPCR5(.) BetPPCR6(.)
θ1 0 0
θ2 0 0
θ3 0 0
θ4 0.0002 0.0002
θ5 0 0
θ6 0 0
θ7 0 0
θ8 0.9998 0.9998
Table 58: BetP of mβ0 ⊕mβ1 ⊕mβ3 .
Based on mβ0 ⊕ mβ1 ⊕ mβ3 fusion result, one gets
same result with PCR5 and PCR6 in this case, and one
gets ∆013(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.1875 with
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.8125, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.1875]
and ∆013(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.1875 with
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.8125, 1]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.1875]
and also ∆013(θ8) = 0.1875 with
P (θ8) ∈ [0.8125, 1]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0, 0.1875]
Based on max of Bel or max of Pl, the decision taken
using θ6∪ θ7∪ θ8, θ7∪ θ8 or θ8 for the mβ0 ⊕mβ1 ⊕mβ3
fusion sub-system should be to evacuate the building
B. Same decision must be taken based on DSmP or
BetP values. It is worth to note that the precision8 on
the result obtained with subsystem mβ0 ⊕mβ1 ⊕mβ3 is
much better than with subsystem mβ0=1⊕mβ2=1 since
(∆013(θ8) = 0.1875) < (∆02(θ8) = 0.71176), and also
(∆013(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.1875) < (∆02(θ7 ∪ θ8) = 1), and
(∆013(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 0.1875) < (∆02(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = 1).
8see Example 1 for the numerical results of mβ0=1 ⊕mβ2=1.
- Answer to Q2: The analysis of both fusion sub-
systemsmβ0=1⊕mβ2=1 andmβ0⊕mβ1⊕mβ3 shows
that the mβ0 ⊕mβ1 ⊕mβ3 subsystem must be cho-
sen because it provides the most precise results and
therefor the decision will be to evacuate the build-
ing B whatever the decision-support hypothesis is
chosen θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8, θ7 ∪ θ8 or θ8.
3.6 Using imprecise bba’s
Let’s examine the fusion result when dealing di-
rectly with imprecise bba’s. We just consider here a
simple imprecise example which considers both inputs
of Examples 1 and 2 to generate imprecise bba’s inputs.
Example 9: We consider the imprecise bba’s accord-
ing to input Table 59.
focal element m0(.) m1(.) m2(.) m3(.)
f1 = θ4 ∪ θ8 1 0 0.3 0
f2 = θ6 ∪ θ8 0 [0.75,0.9] 0 [0.10,0.25]
f3 = θ4 ∪ θ8 0 0 0.7 0
It 0 [0.1,0.25] 0 [0.75,0.9]
Table 59: Imprecise quantitative inputs for VBIED
problem.
Applying the conjunctive rule, we have 1×2×2×2 = 8
products to compute which are listed below:
• Product π1 = 1  [0.75, 0.90]  0.3  [0.10, 0.25].
Using operators on sets defined in [6], Vol.1, Chap.
6, one gets π1 = [0.75, 0.90]  [0.03, 0.075] =
[0.0225, 0.0675] which is committed to f1∩f2 = θ8.
• Product π2 = 1  [0.75, 0.90]  0.3  [0.75, 0.90]
is equal to [0.75, 0.90]  [0.225, 0.27] =
[0.16875, 0.243] which is also committed to
f1 ∩ f2 = θ8.
• Product π3 = 1 [0.75, 0.90] 0.7 [0.10, 0.25] =
[0.0525, 0.1575] corresponds to the imprecise mass
of f1 ∩f2 ∩f3 = ∅ which will be redistributed back
to f1, f2 and f3 according to PCR6.
• Product π4 = 1 [0.75, 0.90] 0.7 [0.75, 0.90] =
[0.39375, 0.567] corresponds to the imprecise mass
of f1 ∩ f2 ∩ f3 ∩ It = ∅ which will be redistributed
back to f1, f2, f3 and It according to PCR6.
• Product π5 = 1 [0.10, 0.25] 0.3 [0.10, 0.25] =
[0.003, 0.01875] is committed to f1 ∩ f2 = θ8.
• Product π6 = 1 [0.10, 0.25] 0.3 [0.75, 0.90] =
[0.0225, 0.0675] is committed to f1.
• Product π7 = 1 [0.10, 0.25] 0.7 [0.10, 0.25] =
[0.007, 0.04375] corresponds to the imprecise mass
of f1 ∩ It ∩ f3 ∩ f2 = ∅ which will be redistributed
back to f1, f2, f3 and It according to PCR6.
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• Product π8 = 1  [0.10, 0.25] 0.7 [0.75, 0.90] =
[0.0525, 0.1575] corresponds to the imprecise mass
of f1 ∩ It ∩ f3 ∩ It = ∅ which will be redistributed
back to f1, f3 and It according to PCR6.
We now redistribute the imprecise masses π3, π4, π7
and π8 associated with the empty set using PCR6 prin-
ciple. Lets’ compute the proportions of π3, π4, π7 and
π8 committed to each focal element involved in the con-
flict they are associated with.
• The product π3 = [0.0525, 0.1575] is distributed to
f1, f2 and f3 according to PCR6 as follows
xf1,π3
1
=
yf2,π3
[0.75, 0.90]⊞ [0.10, 0.25]
=
zf3,π3
0.7
=
π3
1⊞ [0.75, 0.90]⊞ [0.10, 0.25]⊞ 0.7
=
[0.0525, 0.1575]
1.7⊞ [0.85, 1.15]
=
[0.0525, 0.1575]
[2.55, 2.85]
= [
0.0525
2.85
,
0.1575
2.55
]
= [0.018421, 0.061765]
whence
xf1,π3 = 1 [0.018421, 0.061765]
= [0.018421, 0.061765]
yf2,π3 = [0.85, 1.15] [0.018421, 0.061765]
= [0.015658, 0.071029]
zf3,π3 = 0.7 [0.018421, 0.061765]
= [0.012895, 0.043236]
• The product π4 = [0.39375, 0.567] is distributed to
f1, f2, f3 and It according to PCR6 as follows
xf1,π4
1
=
yf2,π4
[0.75, 0.90]
=
zf3,π4
0.7
=
wIt,π4
[0.75, 0.90]
=
π4
1⊞ [0.75, 0.90]⊞ 0.7⊞ [0.75, 0.90]
=
[0.39375, 0.567]
[3.2, 3.5]
= [0.1125, 0.177188]
whence
xf1,π4 = 1 [0.1125, 0.177188]
= [0.1125, 0.177188]
yf2,π4 = [0.75, 0.90] [0.1125, 0.177188]
= [0.084375, 0.159469]
zf3,π4 = 0.7 [0.1125, 0.177188]
= [0.07875, 0.124031]
wIt,π4 = [0.75, 0.90] [0.1125, 0.177188]
= [0.084375, 0.159469]
• The product π7 = [0.007, 0.04375] is distributed to
f1, f2, f3 and It according to PCR6 as follows
xf1,π7
1
=
yf2,π7
[0.10, 0.25]
=
zf3,π7
0.7
=
wIt,π7
[0.10, 0.25]
=
π7
1⊞ [0.10, 0.25]⊞ 0.7⊞ [0.10, 0.25]
=
[0.007, 0.04375]
[1.9, 2.2]
= [0.003182, 0.023026]
whence
xf1,π7 = 1 [0.003182, 0.023026]
= [0.003182, 0.023026]
yf2,π7 = [0.10, 0.25] [0.003182, 0.023026]
= [0.000318, 0.005757]
zf3,π7 = 0.7 [0.003182, 0.023026]
= [0.002227, 0.016118]
wIt,π7 = [0.10, 0.25] [0.003182, 0.023026]
= [0.000318, 0.005757]
• The product π8 = [0.0525, 0.1575] is distributed to
f1, f3 and It according to PCR6 as follows
xf1,π8
1
=
zf3,π8
0.7
=
wIt,π8
[0.10, 0.25]⊞ [0.75, 0.90]
=
π8
1⊞ 0.7⊞ [0.10, 0.25]⊞ [0.75, 0.90]
=
[0.0525, 0.1575]
[2.55, 2.85]
= [0.018421, 0.061765]
whence
xf1,π8 = 1 [0.018421, 0.061765]
= [0.018421, 0.061765]
zf3,π8 = 0.7 [0.018421, 0.061765]
= [0.012895, 0.043235]
wIt,π8 = [0.85, 1.15] [0.018421, 0.061765]
= [0.015658, 0.071029]
Summing the results, we get for m0⊕m1⊕m2⊕m3
with PCR6 the following imprecise mPCR6 bba:
mPCR6(θ8) = π1 ⊞ π2 ⊞ π5
= [0.19425, 0.32925]
mPCR6(f1) = xf1,π3 ⊞ xf1,π4 ⊞ xf1,π7 ⊞ xf1,π8
= [0.152524, 0.323743]
mPCR6(f2) = yf2,π3 ⊞ yf2,π4 ⊞ yf2,π7
= [0.100351, 0.236255]
mPCR6(f3) = zf3,π3 ⊞ zf3,π4 ⊞ zf3,π7 ⊞ zf3,π8
= [0.106767, 0.226620]
mPCR6(It) = wIt,π4 ⊞ wIt,π7 ⊞ wIt,π8
= [0.100351, 0.236255]
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where ⊞,  and  operators (i.e. the addition, mul-
tiplication and division of imprecise values), and other
operators on sets, were defined in [6], Vol. 1, p127–130
by
S1 ⊞ S2 = {x|x = s1 + s2, s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2}
S1  S2 = {x|x = s1 · s2, s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2}
S1  S2 = {x|x = s1/s2, s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2}
with
inf(S1 ⊞ S2) = inf(S1) + inf(S2)
sup(S1 ⊞ S2) = sup(S1) + sup(S2)
and
inf(S1  S2) = inf(S1) · inf(S2)
sup(S1  S2) = sup(S1) · sup(S2)
and
inf(S1  S2) = inf(S1)/ sup(S2)
sup(S1  S2) = sup(S1)/ inf sup(S2)
We have summarized the results in Table 60. The left
column of this table corresponds to the imprecise val-
ues of mPCR6 based on exact calculus with operators
on sets (i.e. the exact calculus with imprecision). The
right column of this table (mapproxPCR6 ) corresponds to
the result obtained with non exact calculus based on
results given in Examples 1 and 2 in right columns of
Tables 2 and 12. This is what we call approximate
results since they are not based on exact calculus
with operators on sets. One shows an important
differences between results in left and right columns
which can make an impact on final decision process
when working with imprecise bba’s and we suggest to
always use exact calculus (more complicated) instead
of approximate calculus (more easier) in order to get
the real imprecision on bba’s values. Same approach
can be done for combining imprecise bba’s with PCR5
(not reported in this paper).
focal element mPCR6(.) m
approx
PCR6 (.)
θ8 [0.194250,0.329250] [0.24375,0.27300]
f1 = θ4 ∪ θ8 [0.152524,0.323743] [0.23935,0.29641]
f2 = θ6 ∪ θ8 [0.100351,0.236255] [0.14587, 0.16950]
f3 = θ4 ∪ θ8 [0.106767,0.226620] [0.14865,0.16811]
It [0.100351,0.236255] [0.14587, 0.16950]
Table 60: Results of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 59.
Based on results on left column of Table 60, one can
easily compute the imprecise Bel and Pl values also of
decision-support hypotheses which are
Bel(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = [0.294601, 0.565505]
Pl(θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) = [0.654243, 1.352123]≡ [0.654243, 1]
Bel(θ7 ∪ θ8) = [0.194250, 0.329250]
Pl(θ7 ∪ θ8) = [0.654243, 1.352123]≡ [0.654243, 1]
Bel(θ8) = [0.194250, 0.329250]
Pl(θ8) = [0.547476, 1.125502]≡ [0.547476, 1]
Therefore, one gets the following imprecision ranges
for probabilities
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.294601, 1]
P (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.705399]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0.194250, 1]
P (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [0, 0.805750]
P (θ8) ∈ [0.194250, 1]
P (θ¯8) ∈ [0, 0.805750]
Based on max of Bel or max of Pl criteria, one sees
that the decision will be to evacuate the building B
whatever the decision-support hypothesis we prefer
θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8, θ7 ∪ θ8 or θ8.
Let’s compute now the imprecise DSmP values for
ǫ = 0.001. The focal element f1 = θ4 ∪ θ8 is redis-
tributed back to θ4 and θ8 directly proportionally to
their corresponding masses and cardinalities
xθ4
0⊞ 0.001
=
y′θ8
[0.194250, 0.329250]⊞ 0.001
=
mPCR6(θ4 ∪ θ8)
0.002⊞ [0.194250, 0.329250]
=
[0.152524, 0.323743]
[0.196250, 0.331250]
= [
0.152524
0.331250
,
0.323743
0.196250
]
= [0.46045, 1.64965]
whence
xθ4 = 0.001 [0.46045, 1.64965]
= [0.000460, 0.001650]
y′θ8 = [0.195250, 0.330250] [0.46045, 1.64965]
= [0.089903, 0.544797]
The focal element f2 = θ6∪θ8 is redistributed back to
θ6 and θ8 directly proportionally to their corresponding
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masses and cardinalities
zθ6
0⊞ 0.001
=
y′′θ8
[0.194250, 0.329250]⊞ 0.001
=
mPCR6(θ6 ∪ θ8)
0.002⊞ [0.194250, 0.329250]
=
[0.100351, 0.236255]
[0.196250, 0.331250]
= [0.302943, 1.20385]
whence
zθ6 = 0.001 [0.302943, 1.20385]
= [0.000303, 0.001204]
y′′θ8 = [0.195250, 0.330250] [0.302943, 1.20385]
= [0.0591496, 0.3975714]
The focal element f3 = θ4 ∪ θ8 which is also equal to
θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ θ3 ∪ θ5 ∪ θ6 ∪ θ7 is redistributed back to θ1,
θ2, θ3, θ5, θ6 and θ7 directly proportionally to their
corresponding masses and cardinalities
wθ1
0⊞ 0.001
=
wθ2
0⊞ 0.001
=
wθ3
0⊞ 0.001
=
wθ5
0⊞ 0.001
=
wθ6
0⊞ 0.001
=
wθ7
0⊞ 0.001
=
mPCR6(θ4 ∪ θ8)
0.006
=
[0.106767, 0.226620]
0.006
= [17.7945, 37.770]
Since all are equal, we get
wθ1 = wθ2 = wθ3 = wθ5 = wθ6 = wθ7
= 0.001 [17.7945, 37.770]
= [0.0177945, 0.03777]
The total ignorance It = θ1∪θ2∪θ3∪θ4∪θ5∪θ6∪θ7∪θ8
is redistributed back to all eight elements of the frame
Θ directly proportionally to their corresponding masses
and cardinalities
vθ1
0⊞ 0.001
=
vθ2
0⊞ 0.001
=
vθ3
0⊞ 0.001
=
vθ4
0⊞ 0.001
=
vθ5
0⊞ 0.001
=
vθ6
0⊞ 0.001
=
vθ7
0⊞ 0.001
=
vθ8
[0.194250, 0.329250]⊞ 0.001
=
mPCR6(It)
[0.194250, 0.329250]⊞ 0.008
=
[0.100351, 0.236255]
[0.202550, 0.337250
= [0.297557, 1.16813]
whence
vθ1 = vθ2 = vθ3 = vθ4 = vθ5 = vθ6 = vθ7
= 0.001 [0.297557, 1.16813]
= [0.000298, 0.001168]
vθ8 = [0.195250, 0.330250] [0.297557, 1.16813]
= [0.058098, 0.385775]
The imprecise DSmP probabilities are computed by
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ1) = wθ1 ⊞ vθ1
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ2) = wθ2 ⊞ vθ2
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ3) = wθ3 ⊞ vθ3
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ4) = xθ4 ⊞ vθ4
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ5) = wθ5 ⊞ vθ5
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ6) = zθ6 ⊞ wθ6 ⊞ vθ6
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ7) = wθ7 ⊞ vθ7
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ8) = y
′
θ8
⊞ y′′θ8 ⊞ vθ8
which are summarized9 in Table 61 below.
Singletons DSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 [0.0181,0.0389]
θ2 [0.0181,0.0389]
θ3 [0.0181,0.0389]
θ4 [0.0008,0.0028]
θ5 [0.0181,0.0389]
θ6 [0.0184 0.0402]
θ7 [0.0181,0.0389]
θ8 [0.2072,1]
Table 61: Imprecise DSmPǫ of m0⊕m1⊕m2⊕m3 for
Table 59.
- Answer to Q1: As we have shown, it is possi-
ble to fuse imprecise bba’s with PCR6, and PCR5
too (see [6], Vol. 2) to get an imprecise result
for decision-making support under uncertainty and
imprecision. It is also possible to compute the ex-
act imprecise values of DSmP if necessary. Accord-
ing to our analysis and our results, and using either
the max of Bel, the max of Pl of the max of DSmP
criterion, the decision will be to evacuate the build-
ing B. Of course, a similar analysis can be done
to answer to the question Q2 when working with
imprecise bba’s, and for for computing imprecise
BetP values as well.
4 Qualitative approach
In this section we just show how the fusion and decision-
making can be done using qualitative information ex-
pressed with labels. In our previous examples the quan-
titative baa’s have been defined ad-hoc in satisfying
9Actually for θ8, one gets with exact calculus of imprecision
DSmPǫ,PCR6(θ8) = [0.2072, 1.3281], but since a probability can-
not be greater than 1, the upper bound of imprecision interval
has been set to 1.
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some reasonable modeling and using minimal assump-
tion compatible with what is given in the statement
of the VBIED problem. The numerical values can be
slightly changed (as we have shown in Examples 1 and
2, or in Examples 3 or 4) or they can even be taken
as imprecise as in Example 9, but they still need to be
kept coherent with sources reports in order to obtain
what we consider as pertinent and motivated and fully
justified answers to questions Q1 and Q2.
In this section we show how to solve the problem
using qualitative information using labels. We investi-
gate the possibility to work either with a minimal set
of labels {L1 = Low,L2 = High} (i.e. with m = 2
labels) or a more refined set consisting in 3 labels
{L1 = Low,L2 = Medium,L3 = High} (i.e. with
m = 3 labels). Each set is extended with minimal
L0 and maximal Lm+1 labels as follows (see [6], Vol.3,
Chap. 2 for examples and details)
L2 = {L0 ≡ 0, L1 = Low,L2 = High, L3 ≡ 1}
and
L3 = {L0 ≡ 0, L1 = Low,L2 =Medium,
L3 = High, L4 ≡ 1}
To simplify the presentation, we only present the re-
sults when combining directly the sources altogether
and considering that they have all the same maximal re-
liability and importance in the fusion process. In other
words, we just consider the qualitative counterpart of
Example 1 only.
4.1 Fusion of sources using L2
Example 10: When using L2, the qualitative inputs
10
of the VBIED problem are chosen according to Table
62.
focal element qm0(.) qm1(.) qm2(.) qm3(.)
θ4 ∪ θ8 L3 L0 L1 L0
θ6 ∪ θ8 L0 L2 L0 L1
θ4 ∪ θ8 L0 L0 L2 L0
It L0 L1 L0 L2
Table 62: Qualitative inputs using L2.
Using DSm field and linear algebra of refined labels
based on equidistant labels assumption, one gets the
following mapping between labels and numbers L0 ≡ 0,
L1 ≡ 1/3, L2 ≡ 2/3 and L3 ≡ 1 and therefore, the
Table 62 is equivalent to the quantitative inputs table
63 (which are close to the numerical values taken in
Example 1).
Applying PCR5 and PCR6 fusion rules, one gets the
results given in Table 64 for quantitative and approxi-
mate qualitative bba’s.
10When dealing with qualitative information, we prefix the no-
tations with ’q’ letter, for example quantitative bbam(.) becomes
qualitative bba qm(.), etc.
focal element m0(.) m1(.) m2(.) m3(.)
θ4 ∪ θ8 1 0 1/3 0
θ6 ∪ θ8 0 2/3 0 1/3
θ4 ∪ θ8 0 0 2/3 0
It 0 1/3 0 2/3
Table 63: Corresponding quantitative inputs.
focal element mPCR5 ≈ qmPCR5 qmPCR6 ≈ qmPCR6
θ8 0.25926 ≈ L1 0.25926 ≈ L1
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.36145 ≈ L1 0.3157 ≈ L1
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.093855 ≈ L0 0.13198 ≈ L0
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.19158 ≈ L1 0.16108 ≈ L0
It 0.093855 ≈ L0 0.13198 ≈ L0
Table 64: Results of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 62.
One sees that the crude approximation of numerical
values to their closest corresponding labels in L2 can
yield to unnormalized qualitative bba. For example,
qmPCR6(.) is not normalized since the sum of labels
of focal elements in the right column of Table 64 is
L1 + L1 + L0 + L0 + L0 = L2 6= L3. To preserve the
normalization of qbba result it is better to work with
refined labels as suggested in [6], Vol.3, Chap. 2. Using
refined labels, one will get now a better approximation
as shown in the Table 65.
focal element mPCR5 ≈ qmPCR5 mPCR6 ≈ qmPCR6
θ8 0.25926 ≈ L0.79 0.25926 ≈ L0.79
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.36145 ≈ L1.08 0.31570 ≈ L0.95
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.09385 ≈ L0.28 0.13198 ≈ L0.39
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.19158 ≈ L0.57 0.16108 ≈ L0.48
It 0.09385 ≈ L0.28 0.13198 ≈ L0.39
Table 65: Results of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 with refined
labels.
It can be easily verified that the qbba’s based on
refined label approximations are now (qualitatively)
normalized (because the sum of refined labels of each
column is equal to L3).
The results of qDSmP based on refined and crude
approximations are given in Table 66.
Singletons qDSmPǫ,PCR5(.) qDSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0323 ≈ L0.10 ≈ L0 0.0273 ≈ L0.08 ≈ L0
θ2 0.0323 ≈ L0.10 ≈ L0 0.0273 ≈ L0.08 ≈ L0
θ3 0.0323 ≈ L0.10 ≈ L0 0.0273 ≈ L0.08 ≈ L0
θ4 0.0017 ≈ L0.00 ≈ L0 0.0017 ≈ L0.01 ≈ L0
θ5 0.0323 ≈ L0.10 ≈ L0 0.0274 ≈ L0.08 ≈ L0
θ6 0.0326 ≈ L0.10 ≈ L0 0.0279 ≈ L0.08 ≈ L0
θ7 0.0323 ≈ L0.10 ≈ L0 0.0273 ≈ L0.08 ≈ L0
θ8 0.8042 ≈ L2.40 ≈ L2 0.8338 ≈ L2.51 ≈ L3
Table 66: Results of qDSmPǫ for Table 62.
Answer to Q1 using crude approximation: Based
on these qualitative results, one sees that using crude
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approximation (i.e. using only labels in L2) one gets11
• with qPCR5
qP (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L1, L3]
qP (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L0, L2]
qP (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L1, L3]
qP (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L0, L2]
qP (θ8) ∈ [L1, L2]
qP (θ¯8) ∈ [L1, L2]
• with qPCR6
qP (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L1, L2]
qP (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L1, L2]
qP (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L1, L2]
qP (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L1, L2]
qP (θ8) ∈ [L1, L2]
qP (θ¯8) ∈ [L1, L2]
These results show that is is almost impossible to
answer clearly and fairly to the question Q1 using
the max of Bel or the max of Pl criteria based on
such very inaccurate qualitative bba’s using such
crude approximation. However it is possible and
easy to answer to Q1 using qualitative DSmP value.
However and according to Table 66, the final decision
must be to evacuate the building B when consider-
ing the level of DSmP values of θ6∪θ7∪θ8, θ7∪θ8, or θ8.
Answer to Q1 using refined approximation: Us-
ing the refined approximation using refined labels which
is more accurate, one gets
• with qPCR5
qP (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L1.07, L3]
qP (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L0, L1.93]
qP (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L0.79, L3]
qP (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L0, L2.21]
qP (θ8) ∈ [L0.79, L2.43]
qP (θ¯8) ∈ [L0.57, L2.21]
11The derivations of qBel(X¯) and qP l(X¯) were obtained us-
ing qualitative extension of Dempster’s formulas [5], i.e. with
qBel(X¯) = Lm − qP l(X) and qP l(X¯) = Lm − qBel(X). These
results are valid only if the qbba is normalized, but are used here
even when using non normalized qbba as crude approximation.
• with qPCR6
qP (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L1.18, L3]
qP (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L0, L1.82]
qP (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L0.79, L3]
qP (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L0, L2.21]
qP (θ8) ∈ [L0.79, L2.52]
qP (θ¯8) ∈ [L0.48, L2.21]
One sees that accuracy of the result obtained using re-
fined labels allows us to take the decision more easily.
Indeed, using the refined approximation, it is possible
here to take the decision based on the max of Bel, or
on the max of Pl and whatever the decision-support hy-
pothesis used (θ6∪θ7∪θ8, or θ7∪θ8, or θ8), the answer
to question Q1 is: Evacuation of the building B.
The same decision can also be taken from the analy-
sis of qDSmP values as well when considering refined
labels in Table 66.
4.2 Fusion of sources using L3
Here we propose to go further in our analysis and
to use a bit more refined set of labels defined by L3.
We need to adapt the qualitative inputs of the VBIED
problem in order to work with L3.
Example 11: We propose to solve the VBIED problem
for the following qualitative inputs which reflects what
is reported by the sources when using labels belonging
to L3.
focal element qm0(.) qm1(.) qm2(.) qm3(.)
θ4 ∪ θ8 L4 L0 L1 L0
θ6 ∪ θ8 L0 L3 L0 L1
θ4 ∪ θ8 L0 L0 L3 L0
It L0 L1 L0 L3
Table 67: Qualitative inputs based on L3.
Based on the equidistant labels assumption, one gets
the following mapping between labels and numbers
L0 ≡ 0, L1 ≡ 1/4, L2 ≡ 2/4, L3 ≡ 3/4 and L4 = 1
and therefore, the Table 67 is equivalent to the quan-
titative inputs table 68 (which are more close to the
numerical values taken in Example 1 than the inputs
chosen in Table 63 for Example 10).
focal element m0(.) m1(.) m2(.) m3(.)
θ4 ∪ θ8 1 0 0.25 0
θ6 ∪ θ8 0 0.75 0 0.25
θ4 ∪ θ8 0 0 0.75 0
It 0 0.25 0 0.75
Table 68: Corresponding quantitative inputs.
Applying PCR5 and PCR6 fusion rules, one gets the
results given in Table 69 for quantitative and approxi-
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mate qualitative bba’s using refined and crude approx-
imations of labels.
foc. elem. mPCR5 ≈ qmPCR5 mPCR6 ≈ qmPCR6
θ8 0.20312 ≈ L0.81 ≈ L1 0.20312 ≈ L0.81 ≈ L1
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.34269 ≈ L1.37 ≈ L1 0.29979 ≈ L1.21 ≈ L1
θ6 ∪ θ8 0.11617 ≈ L0.47 ≈ L0 0.15370 ≈ L0.61 ≈ L1
θ4 ∪ θ8 0.22185 ≈ L0.88 ≈ L1 0.18969 ≈ L0.76 ≈ L1
It 0.11617 ≈ L0.47 ≈ L0 0.15370 ≈ L0.61 ≈ L1
Table 69: Results of m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 for Table 67.
It can be easily verified that the qbba’s based on re-
fined label approximations are (qualitatively) normal-
ized because the sum of refined labels of each column is
equal to L4. Using crude approximation when working
only with labels in L3 we get non normalized qbba’s.
The results of qDSmP based on refined and crude ap-
proximations are given in Table 70.
Singletons qDSmPǫ,PCR5(.) qDSmPǫ,PCR6(.)
θ1 0.0375 ≈ L0.15 ≈ L0 0.0323 ≈ L0.13 ≈ L0
θ2 0.0375 ≈ L0.15 ≈ L0 0.0323 ≈ L0.13 ≈ L0
θ3 0.0375 ≈ L0.15 ≈ L0 0.0323 ≈ L0.13 ≈ L0
θ4 0.0022 ≈ L0.01 ≈ L0 0.0022 ≈ L0.01 ≈ L0
θ5 0.0375 ≈ L0.15 ≈ L0 0.0323 ≈ L0.13 ≈ L0
θ6 0.0381 ≈ L0.15 ≈ L0 0.0331 ≈ L0.13 ≈ L0
θ7 0.0375 ≈ L0.15 ≈ L0 0.0323 ≈ L0.13 ≈ L0
θ8 0.7722 ≈ L3.09 ≈ L3 0.8032 ≈ L3.21 ≈ L3
Table 70: Results obtained with qDSmPǫ for Table 67.
Ones sees that the use of refined labels allows to
obtain normalized qualitative probabilities. This is
not possible to get normalized qualitative probabilities
when using only crude approximations with labels in
L3 for this example.
Answer to Q1: Using refined labels (which is more
accurate), one gets finally
• with qPCR5
qP (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L1.28, L4]
qP (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L0, L2.72]
qP (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L0.81, L4]
qP (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L0, L3.19]
qP (θ8) ∈ [L0.81, L3.12]
qP (θ¯8) ∈ [L0.88, L3.19]
• with qPCR6
qP (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L1.42, L4]
qP (θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L0, L2.58]
qP (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L0.81, L4]
qP (θ7 ∪ θ8) ∈ [L0, L3.19]
qP (θ8) ∈ [L0.81, L3.24]
qP (θ¯8) ∈ [L0.76, L3.19]
One sees that based with PCR5 or PCR6 whatever
the decision-support hypothesis we consider (θ6∪θ7∪θ8,
θ7 ∪ θ8, or θ8), one will decide to evacuate the building
B based on max of Bel, max of Pl or DSmP values,
except for the case of PCR5 with θ8 based on the max
of Bel, max of Pl. In this case, PCR5 result suggests
to NOT evacuate B contrariwise to PCR6 result. As
far as θ8 is the preferred (optimistic) decision-support
hypothesis, one sees here the main effect of difference
between PCR5 and PCR6 for decision-making support.
But as already stated, for such problem the most pru-
dent strategy for decision-making is to consider the
decisio-support hypothesis θ6 ∪ θ7 ∪ θ8 which captures
all aspects of potential danger. Using such reasonable
strategy, both rules PCR5 and PCR6 yields same deci-
sion: Evacuation of the building B.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a modeling for
solving the Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Device
(VBIED) problem with Dezert-Smarandache Theory
(DSmT) framework. We have shown how it is possi-
ble to compute imprecise probabilities of all decision-
support hypotheses and how to take into account the
reliabilities and the importances of the sources of infor-
mation in decision-making support. The strong impact
of prior information has also been analyzed, as well as
the possibility to deal directly with imprecise sources
of information and even with qualitative reports. We
have answered with the full justification to the two main
questions asked in the VBIED problem by John Lav-
ery and Simon Maskell: 1) what is the final decision to
take, and 2) what is the best fusion subsystem to choose
(APNR or the pool of experts)? The analysis done in
this paper is based on a very limited number of reason-
able assumptions and could be adapted for solving more
complicated security problems involving imprecise, in-
complete and conflicting sources of information.
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